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“A popular government, without popular information, or
the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a
tragedy. . . . [A] people who mean to be their own
governors must arm themselves with the power which
1
knowledge gives.”
I.

INTRODUCTION
2

The above quote by James Madison embodies the core
† J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2008; B.A., Evergreen
State College, 1995.
1. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 3 LETTERS
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 276 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865), quoted
in Prior Lake Am. v. Mader, 642 N.W.2d 729, 735 n.5 (Minn. 2002).
2. Not surprisingly, this quote often appears in commentary and case law
discussing open government issues. See e.g., David J. Barthel, A Healthy Tan Is Better
than Sunburn: Ohio’s “Sunshine Law” and Nonpublic Collective Inquiry Sessions, 34 CAP.
U. L. REV. 251, 252–53 (2005); Theresa M. Nuckolls, Kansas Sunshine Law; How
Bright Does It Shine Now? The Kansas Open Meetings Act, 72 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 34, 45
(2003).
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principles underlying Minnesota’s open meeting law.
Unfortunately, the need for “popular information” occasionally
4
conflicts with the practical realities of running a government. The
Minnesota Supreme Court recently resolved just such a conflict in
Prior Lake American v. Mader, a case in which the protections of
attorney-client privilege proved incompatible with the public
5
interest in open government.
The societal interests underlying attorney-client privilege and
open government clash when public access to information
6
compromises officials’ ability to litigate effectively.
Some
commentators argue that it is unfair and economically inefficient
to resolve this clash by construing public officials’ use of attorney7
client privilege more narrowly than private parties’ use. The Prior
8
Lake court rejected this argument. The court refused to develop a
bright-line rule allowing public officials recourse to the privilege
9
exception whenever litigation looms. Instead, the court validated
the use of a case-by-case balancing test to determine when the
10
privilege exception to the open meeting law is appropriate.
Unfortunately, the court’s use of this test depended on broad and
3. Minnesota’s open meeting law is codified at Minnesota Statutes section
13D.01 (2004).
4. See MINN. STAT. § 13D.05 subdiv. 3 (2004) (listing six specific exceptions
where the practical concerns of running the government outweigh the public’s
interest in open meetings).
5. Prior Lake, 642 N.W.2d at 731.
6. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 310
Minn. 313, 323, 251 N.W.2d 620, 625 (1976) (“A basic understanding of the
adversary system indicates that certain phases of litigation strategy may be
impaired if every discussion is available for the benefit of opposing parties who
may have as a purpose a private gain in contravention to the public need as
construed by the agency.”).
7. “Attorneys representing government actors need to be placed on equal
footing with attorneys representing private clients who seek to further their
clients’ individual interests.” Marion J. Radson & Elizabeth A. Waratuke, The
Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges of Government Entities, 30 STETSON L. REV.
799, 820–21 (2001). See generally Todd A. Ellinwood, “In the Light of Reason and
Experience”: The Case for a Strong Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 2001 WIS. L. REV.
1291, 1292 (2001) (arguing for an expansion of the privilege to avoid
disadvantaging government attorneys and, as a result, exposing the public to
excess cost).
8. “[U]nlike persons in private life, a public agency . . . has no autonomous
right of confidentiality in communications relating to governmental business.”
Prior Lake, 642 N.W.2d at 737 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 74 cmt. b (1998)).
9. Id. at 738.
10. Id.
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undefined policy rationales and thus gave practitioners little
guidance on how to counsel their government clients to remain in
compliance with the law.
This note begins with an abridged history of the conflict
11
between attorney-client privilege and open government. It follows
this discussion with an examination and analysis of Prior Lake’s
12
resolution of this conflict. This note concludes that the Prior Lake
resolution provides an effective analytic framework for courts, but
does not help legal practitioners determine when they may close
13
meetings under the privilege exception.
II. HISTORY
A. Open Meeting Laws
Open meeting laws (or “sunshine laws”) require that
government bodies and agencies open their meetings to the public
and provide the public with notice as to when those meetings will
14
be held. They are a modern phenomenon; most open meeting
laws were enacted during the 1950s as a result of organized
15
advocacy by journalists and civic groups. Before 1952, Alabama
16
By
was the only state that had enacted an open meeting law.
17
1962, twenty-six other states had followed suit.
Today, all fifty
states and the District of Columbia have open meeting statutes of
18
These laws reflect the view that open
one form or another.
government promotes honest, efficient, and informed decision
19
making and inspires public confidence.
Typically, these laws
11. See infra Parts II, III.
12. See infra Parts IV, V.
13. See infra Part VI.
14. See Teresa D. Pupillo, Note, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in
the Sunshine in the 1990’s—An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q.
1165, 1165 (1993). See also John F. O’Connor & Michael J. Baratz, Some Assembly
Required: The Application of State Open Meeting Laws to Email Correspondence, 12 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 719, 719 (2004).
15. See Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the “Right to Know,” 75
HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1199 (1962) [hereinafter Right to Know].
16. Id. at 1199–1200. Florida enacted an open meeting statute in 1905, but it
applied only to city councils. See Peter H. Seed, Florida’s Sunshine Law: The
Undecided Legal Issue, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 215 (2002).
17. Right to Know, supra note 15, at 1199.
18. See Pupillo, supra note 14, at 1167.
19. See Note, The Minnesota Open Meeting Law After Twenty Years—A Second
Look, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 375, 377 (1979) [hereinafter Minnesota Open Meeting
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apply to municipal bodies and public agencies but not state
legislatures.
The general trend in the development of state open meeting
laws has been one of statutory enactments book-ending periods of
judicial interpretation. Courts have tended to narrowly construe
the laws' requirement of openness. These narrow constructions
have in turn inspired legislatures to amend the laws, broadening
the laws' applicability and minimizing or eliminating judicially
20
created exceptions to their mandates.
Legislatures have also
instituted various notice and reporting requirements designed to
guarantee some measure of transparency even when meetings
21
could be closed.
These new statutory provisions have led to
further litigation that has forced courts to revise or refine their
22
earlier rulings.
Twenty-five states have incorporated “purpose statements” into
23
their open meeting laws. These purpose statements evince the
Law].
20. See Pupillo, supra note 14, at 1176–77. See generally Peter G. Guthrie,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes Making Public
Proceedings Open to the Public, 38 A.L.R. 3d 1070 (2006).
21. Pupillo, supra note 14, at 1170–73. For instance, Minnesota’s open
meeting law requires the posting of irregularly scheduled meeting notices on a
public bulletin board, as well as mailings to any person who has requested notice
of meeting times and places, even when the meeting is to be closed. MINN. STAT. §
13D.04, subdivs. 2, 5 (2004). It also requires officials to describe for the record
why the meeting is to be closed, and the subject to be discussed in the closed
meeting, before adjourning into a closed session. § 13D.01, subdiv. 3.
22. See Roberts v. City of Palmdale, 853 P.2d 496, 503–05 (Cal. 1993)
(interpreting amendments to the “Brown Act,” California’s open meeting law);
Sch. Bd. of Duval County v. Fla. Publ’g Co., 670 So. 2d 99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(interpreting what was then Florida’s new statutory attorney-client privilege
exception); McKay v. Bd. of City Comm’rs, 746 P.2d 124, 125–26 (Nev. 1987)
(listing a number of statutory exemptions enacted over the history of the open
meeting law, and then applying the new legislatively created government privilege
exception); Markowski v. City of Marlin, 940 S.W.2d 720, 726 (Tex. App. 1997)
(interpreting Texas’ then recently enacted attorney-client privilege exception); see
also Gerald A. Daniel, Jr., Some Time in the Shade: Giving the Public’s Legal Counsel
Some Relief Under Alabama’s Sunshine Law, 9 T.G. JONES L. REV. 55, 72 (2005)
(explaining how Alabama’s new open meeting legislation derives from recent case
law); Nuckolls, supra note 2, at 37 (asserting that the Kansas legislature refined the
statutory definition of “meeting” in reaction to a Kansas Supreme Court decision);
Seed, supra note 16, at 218–60 (charting the interplay between statutory
enactments and judicial interpretations of the “per se board rule”).
23. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.312 (2006); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950 (West 2006);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-2340 (2006); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 120/1 (West 2005);
IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-1 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 21.1 (West 2006); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-4317 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.800 (LexisNexis 2005); LA.
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policy interests buttressing the laws, and tend to be written in broad
24
and sweeping abstractions. They often refer to the principle of
popular sovereignty—the idea that governments (and their
decisions) achieve legitimacy through the consent of the
25
governed.
Purpose statements also often refer to what one
26
commentator labeled “the normative concept of transparency.”
This concept is embodied in language such as that found in
Pennsylvania’s open meeting law, which reads, “the right of the
public to be present at all meetings of agencies and to witness the
deliberation, policy formation and decision-making of agencies is
vital to the enhancement and proper functioning of the democratic
27
process.” The legislatures’ reliance on this “normative concept”
to justify open government reveals an assumption that citizens will
actually make use of “popular information” to ensure effective and

REV. STAT ANN. § 42:4:1 (2006); MD. CODE. ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-501 (LexisNexis
2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-41-1 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 610.110 (West 2006);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 241.010 (LexisNexis 2005); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 100
(McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-318.9 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 25, § 302 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.620 (West 2003); 65 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 702 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-1 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. §
8-44-101 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-102 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 311
(2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.30.010 (West 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6-9A-1
(LexisNexis 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.81 (West 2003). See also Pupillo, supra note
14, at 1185 n.137.
24. For example, the Mississippi purpose statement reads, in part:
It [is] essential to the fundamental philosophy of the American
constitutional form of representative government and to the
maintenance of a democratic society that public business be performed
in an open and public manner, and that citizens be advised of and be
aware of the performance of public officials and the deliberations and
decisions that go into the making of public policy . . . .
MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-41-1 (2006). The Oklahoma legislature justified its law with
a shorter but no less abstract statement: “It is the public policy of the State of
Oklahoma to encourage and facilitate an informed citizenry’s understanding of
the governmental processes and governmental problems.” 25 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
25, § 302 (West 2006).
25. California legislators wrote an exceptionally strong statement of purpose
into their open meeting law:
The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies
which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their
public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know
and what is good for them not to know. The people insist on remaining
informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have
created.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950 (West 2006).
26. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 885 (2006).
27. 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702 (West 2006).
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28

efficient governance.
Perhaps sensing that “transparency” is a weak foundation for
the right to open government, commentators have urged courts to
locate that right in the firmer ground of the First Amendment, but
29
to no avail.
Courts have instead deferred to legislatures and
grounded open meeting law decisions in the abstract policy
30
rationales noted above. The choice of a policy foundation over a
constitutional foundation has implications when courts weigh
enforcement of open meeting laws in the face of contradictory
statutes or common law rules. In general, the result of this process
31
has been hesitant and inconsistent enforcement by the courts.
Most open meeting laws contain exceptions that allow agencies
32
to close meetings when specific criteria have been satisfied. One
common exception allows for closed meetings where the
government’s attorney-client privilege might otherwise be
33
compromised.
B. The Government Attorney-Client Privilege
Use of the attorney-client privilege dates back to the sixteenth
34
Though the basic function of the attorney-client
century.
privilege has not changed much since its inception, its policy
justifications have evolved. Originally meant to protect the
attorney’s oath by precluding him from testifying against a client, it

28. Professor Fenster writes, “[as] a descriptive concept claimed to be at the
core of democracy, transparency fails to consider the tensions it conceals. It
assumes too much of the state, of government information, and of the public . . . .”
Fenster, supra note 26, at 892.
29. Right to Know, supra note 15, at 1204.
30. Id. See also Minnesota Open Meeting Law, supra note 19, at 380.
31. See Pupillo, supra note 14, at 1176.
32. See Minnesota Open Meeting Law, supra note 19, at 400–10. See also Jay M.
Zitter, Annotation, Pending or Prospective Litigation Exception Under State Law Making
Proceedings by Public Bodies Open to the Public, 35 A.L.R.5th 113 (1996). Common
exceptions include employee disciplinary proceedings, criminal investigations,
meetings to discuss land acquisitions or labor contracts, and meetings of quasijudicial bodies, as well as meetings pertaining to pending or ongoing litigation. Id.
33. Melanie B. Leslie, Government Officials as Attorneys and Clients: Why Privilege
the Privileged?, 77 IND. L.J. 469, 504 (2002). Four states contain no attorney-client
privilege exception to their open meeting law: Arkansas, Maryland, Massachusetts,
and Nevada. In these states, all meetings between municipal government officials
and their attorneys must be open to the public. Id. at 504, 550 n.174.
34. Patricia E. Salkin, Beware: What You Say to Your [Government] Lawyer May Be
Held Against You—The Erosion of Government Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 35 URB.
LAW. 283–84 (2003).
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now serves primarily to promote full communication and disclosure
35
by clients to their attorneys.
Two sets of rules protect confidential communications
between attorneys and clients: 1) evidentiary rules prohibiting use
of information covered by the privilege; and 2) ethical rules
36
barring disclosure of privileged information.
Both rule sets
embody the notion that effective representation depends on full
37
and frank communication between lawyer and client. The U.S.
Supreme Court located a broad policy grounding in this principle
and used it to justify extension of the privilege to corporate
38
clients.
The Court wrote in Upjohn Co. v. United States that
effective representation of individuals (and by extension
39
corporations) ultimately “serves public ends.”
The common-law evidentiary privilege, as used in United
States courts, traditionally applied to natural persons and
40
corporations, but not governments.
Before 1963, only two
41
jurisdictions recognized the government attorney-client privilege.
At that time, neither the Model Rules of Evidence nor the Uniform
42
Rules of Evidence supported it. But both the Model Rules and
the Uniform Rules eventually addressed the question of
government privilege. The drafters of Proposed Model Rule 503
43
expanded the definition of “client” to include the government.
Though Congress never codified Proposed Rule 503, courts
throughout the country used it to justify common-law expansion of
44
the privilege to include government clients.
The drafters of
Uniform Rule 502 proposed a government privilege with a
45
narrower scope than that of Proposed Rule 503. Rule 502 allowed
for application only when privileged communication concerned a
pending claim, action, or investigation, the disclosure of which
would “seriously impair” the government’s ability to proceed in the

35. See Ellinwood, supra note 7, at 1192. See also Salkin, supra note 34, at 284.
36. Radson & Waratuke, supra note 7, at 802.
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2006). See Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Salkin, supra note 34, at 288.
38. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389–90.
39. Id. at 389.
40. FED. R. EVID. 501; Radson & Waratuke, supra note 7, at 800.
41. Leslie, supra note 33, at 476.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 479.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 480.
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46

public interest. Uniform Rule 502 did not have the impact of
47
Proposed Rule 503. Courts and state legislatures generally drew
48
the government privilege more broadly. As it stands today, the
evidentiary privilege generally protects from disclosure
communications between attorneys and their government clients
related to legal advice, but not communications related to policy or
49
political advice.
Commentators have argued both for and against expansive use
of the evidentiary privilege to protect government entities.
Commentators in favor of expansive use argue that uninhibited
dialogue between government officials and attorneys promotes
efficient decision making and provides an incentive to acknowledge
50
and correct possible misconduct. Arguments against expansive
use include the potential for dishonesty and “total denial of
information to citizenry about the operations of their
51
government.”
In addition to the evidentiary bar to disclosure, the American
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct establish
52
ethical boundaries to protect the privilege. Specifically, Rule 1.6
bars attorney disclosure of information related to representation of
53
a client. Rule 1.13 extends the privilege to public entities and
operates concurrently with the other Rules of Professional
54
Conduct, including Rule 1.6. Comment 9 to Rule 1.13 states:
The duty defined in this Rule applies to government
organizations. Defining precisely the identity of the client
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See Salkin, supra note 34, at 285. For a detailed breakdown of the
elements of common-law attorney-client privilege, see 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 at 542 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
50. See generally Ellinwood, supra note 7. See also Salkin, supra note 34, at 288.
51. 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5475 at 127 (1986).
52. One commentator identifies the three ethical duties adhering to private
practitioners as “loyalty, confidentiality, and zeal.” Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty
of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 958–59 (1991). While these terms are somewhat
abstract, courts and ethicists have been able to define them with enough clarity for
private practitioners to have reasonable guidance in solving ethical problems. The
government attorney, however, has been burdened with a fourth ethical duty:
serving the public interest. Id. at 967. As this casenote asserts, the “public
interest” is a term so malleable as to be almost meaningless. See infra pp. 689–92.
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002).
54. Id. R. 1.13.
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and prescribing the obligations of such lawyers may be
more difficult in the government context and is a matter
beyond the scope of these Rules. . . . [W]hen the client is
a governmental organization, a different balance may be
appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and
55
assuring that [a] wrongful act is prevented.
The Advisory Committee apparently recognized the tensions
inherent in the duty of an attorney serving a government client.
Comment 9 seems to suggest government attorneys should err on
the side of disclosure, given the difficulty in determining whose
interests predominate in such a situation: the government
organization or the public it ostensibly represents. The balancing
test suggested by Comment 9 operates somewhat like a fuse—if the
public interest in disclosure is powerful enough, the duty to
maintain confidentiality shuts down. Deciding when to remove this
duty requires a complex calculation. This calculation inevitably
reveals deep-seated values about the nature of government and
how to determine the “public interest.”
Generally, courts have found that fidelity to the “public
interest” narrows the scope of government attorneys’ duty to
maintain confidentiality. One commentator has noted several
differences between ethical standards applied to government
56
attorneys and those applied to private practitioners.
He
concludes that these differences arise from the government
57
attorneys’ uniquely acute duty to serve the “public interest.”
Given the nebulous nature of this animating value, any bright-line
rules controlling application of the government attorney-client
55. Id. R. 1.13 cmt. 9.
56. See Steven K. Berenson, The Duty Defined: Specific Obligations That Follow
From Civil Government Lawyers’ General Duty To Serve The Public Interest, 42 BRANDEIS
L.J. 13, 67 (2003). Professor Berenson charts several primary differences between
government attorneys and private practitioners as suggested by the courts:
government attorneys have 1) a greater duty to provide information to the courts
and opposing parties, both during discovery and in situations resembling a civil
version of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 2) a higher threshold for
pleading, implicating issues of fairness, and justice; 3) a lower threshold for what
litigation tactics are permissible; 4) a narrower scope of confidentiality afforded to
their clients; and 5) wider latitude in pursuing cases that might otherwise create a
conflict of interest. Id. at 16, 18–19, 47. The last difference seems inconsistent
with the others in that it allows government lawyers more latitude than private
practitioners. Professor Berenson suggests, however, that all these differences
have the common thread of privileging the public interest over the interests of
individual parties. Id. at 67–69.
57. Id. at 68–69.
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privilege appear doomed to generate incoherent and inconsistent
results.
Thus, despite extensive evidentiary and ethical rules, the
contours of government attorney-client privilege remain hazy at
58
best. It even remains unclear as to whom the privilege attaches:
the particular official engaged in the privileged discussion, the
government agency employing that official, the government as a
59
whole, or the public. The relevance of this distinction becomes
apparent when one seeks to determine which policy rationale
underlies the asserted privilege and how that rationale balances
60
with the policy rationales supporting open government.
The
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 97 asserts, in any
case, that “no universal definition of the client of a government
lawyer is possible. . . . Those who speak for the governmental client
may differ from one representation to another. The identity of the
client may also vary depending on the purpose for which the
61
question of identity is posed.”
Some commentators argue it is futile to debate what
constitutes the government client. Robert P. Lawry highlights the
futility of this question by invoking Lord Brougham’s oft quoted
principle of advocacy: “‘[a]n advocate, by the sacred duty which he
owes the client, knows, that in the discharge of that office, but one
62
person in the world, THAT CLIENT AND NONE OTHER.’”
58. See Ellinwood, supra note 7, at 1291.
59. Id. at 1315.
60. Id.
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. c (2000).
Comment c goes on to note, “[f]or many purposes, the preferable approach on
the question presented is to regard the prospective agencies as the clients and to
regard the lawyers working for the agencies as subject to the direction of those
officers authorized to act in the matter involved in the representation.” Id.
62. Robert P. Lawry, Confidences and the Government Lawyer, 57 N.C. L. REV.
625, 628 (1979) (quoting Lord Brougham’s speech in defense of Queen Caroline
before the House of Lords in 1820). The Lord Brougham quote continues:
To save that client by all expedient means—to protect that client at all
hazards and costs to all others, and amongst others to himself—is the
highest, and most unquestioned of his duties; and he must not regard the
alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruction, which he may bring
upon any other. Nay, separating even the duties of a patriot from those
of an advocate, and casting them, if need be, to the wind, he must go on
reckless of consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be, to involve his
country in confusion for his client’s protection.
Id. at 628 n.17.
The tail of this quote illuminates quite clearly the conundrum of the government
attorney: what to do when the duties of a patriot and those of an advocate are
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Lawry argues fixing a definition of “THAT CLIENT” will eventually
inhibit a government attorney’s ethical function because that
function is uniquely susceptible to internal contradictions. He
writes:
Under the present Code of Professional Responsibility, if
the client can be identified as a single human being, the
answers to the following questions are identical and can
be automatically deduced from mere identification of the
client: (1) Who shall the lawyer take direction from in
matters to be decided “by the client”? (2) Whose
“interests” is the lawyer trying to foster or protect? (3)
Whose “confidences” is the lawyer obliged to respect. . . ?
For the government lawyer, however, the answer to each
of these three questions is not necessarily the same. Even
within a single question, the answer may differ from
63
situation to situation.
According to Professor Lawry, a government attorney should
proceed in reverse-order, asking those three crucial questions first
in any given situation and through a balancing of the answers
64
determine whose interests predominate.
The ambiguous nature of the government client is
compounded by the unintelligibility of the “public interest.” As
noted above, courts and commentators suggest that government
attorneys’ normal ethical duties are circumscribed by their special
duty to act in the public interest. But government attorneys are ill
suited to determine the public interest, as their job is simply to
implement measures calculated to meet the public interest. It is
the officials or agencies served by the attorney who determine what
practically constitutes the “public interest.” An attorney whose
concept of the public interest clashes with the interest advanced by
those elected officials puts himself in the position of contradicting
the wishes of the majority. And, as Judge Easterbrook points out,
“public interest” is an empty term unless it is being used as a
euphemism for the aggregated personal interests of the majority:
[T]here is no virtuous way to aggregate private wills into
collective decisions. People of good will have no common
simultaneously inseparable and at odds?
63. Id. at 631–32.
64. See generally Robert P. Lawry, Who Is the Client of the Federal Government
Lawyer? An Analysis of the Wrong Question, 37 FED. B. J. 61 (1978) (proposing a
method by which government attorneys can determine the true identity of their
client).
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ground around which to rally! They have their own
conceptions of the public interest but no way to insist that
the collective choice necessarily reflect their views. We are
doomed by the logic of majority voting to aggregate
65
private preferences rather than to find a public good.
Judge Easterbrook’s argument leads him to conclude: “when
faction dominates the creation of laws, judges cannot interpret laws
66
In other words, legislative intent
to serve the public interest.”
articulates the “aggregate of private preferences” and not the
“public interest.” Through this formulation, Judge Easterbrook
unmasks judges’ attempts to justify their decisions by appealing to
the common good. He reveals those decisions to be motivated by
judges’ personal values rather than by a judicial aggregation of
67
values held by individual members of the community.
In the arena of government attorney-client privilege,
therefore, decisions about when to honor the privilege appear to
rise from personal interests and values, not the “public interest.”
Whether it is an attorney trying to determine when to honor the
privilege, or a judge trying to determine whether to sanction the
attorney’s actions, the decision maker’s personal values ultimately
68
animate the decision.
C. Sacramento: The Prototypical Clash
Soon after state open meeting laws became commonplace,
conflicts arose between their provisions and the protections
69
guaranteed by the government attorney-client privilege.
These
65. Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public
Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1339 (1994).
66. Id. at 1346.
67. See id.
68. See Note, Conflicts of Interest and Government Attorneys, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1413–15 (1981) (“One of the principal purposes of government is to provide a set
of instructions that analyze and define the public interest. No individual attorney
can hope to perform this task on his own. . . . In many situations, there will be
little distinction between the goal of effective representation of the government
“client” and that of good government in and of itself. When there is a conflict,
however, it is the lawyer’s duty, not just as a lawyer, but also as a public citizen, to
choose the path more beneficial to the latter goal.”). The author of the note fails
to catch the paradox of the above quote: attorneys cannot be unable to define the
“public interest” yet also be expected to act on that “public interest.” The point
remains, however, as Judge Easterbrook established, that an individual’s
conception of the “public interest” is nothing but his or her personal values
cloaked in a lofty abstraction.
69. See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Attorney-Client Exception Under State

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss2/8

12

Riach: Civil Procedure—Epilogue to a Farce: Reestablishing the Power of
8. RIACH - RC.DOC

2007]

3/7/2007 1:26:07 PM

PRIOR LAKE AMERICAN V. MADER

693

conflicts led to litigation. The history of this litigation has been
that of courts ostensibly struggling to balance the values underlying
open government with those underlying the government
70
privilege. The courts’ struggles rise from the indeterminate and
protean nature of those values, as well as the inevitable personal
biases noted by Judge Easterbrook in the previous section. The
seminal California case Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento
71
County Board of Supervisors provides a clear example of how a
court’s difficulty in defining the “public interest” can hamstring it
when it seeks to balance open government with the government
privilege.
The Sacramento court sought to resolve a conflict between the
state open meeting law and the state’s attorney-client privilege
72
statute. The court balanced the policy interests behind the two
statutes by precluding arbitrary or unnecessary invocations of
73
privilege that would defeat the purpose of the open meeting law.
The case proved influential on other state courts, and particularly
74
on Minnesota courts.
The Sacramento court held that meetings of a county board of
supervisors with their attorneys could be properly closed, despite
California’s existing open meeting law (commonly called the
75
“Brown Act”). The court based its decision on what it perceived
76
to be the values underlying the open meeting law. It wrote, “the
77
right to disclosure is an attribute of citizenship.”
It further
suggested that interpreting the law required “inquiry into [its]

Law Making Proceedings by Public Bodies Open to the Public, 34 A.L.R. 5th 591 (1995)
(comparing cases discussing this issue from thirty-three different states).
70. Id. See also Zitter, supra note 32, at 113.
71. 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968), superseded by statute, CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 11126(e) (West 2006) (effective 1987), as recognized in Funeral Sec. Plans,
Inc. v. State Bd. Of Funeral Dirs. and Embalmers, 18 Cal. Rptr.2d 39 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993).
72. Id. At the time Sacramento was decided, California’s open meeting law did
not contain an exception for meetings which might implicate the attorney-client
privilege. Id. at 488. The legislature provided that exception with the enactment
of section 11126(e), which sets forth extensive but specific guidelines as to the
type of situations which trigger the attorney-client privilege exception. CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 11126(e).
73. Sacramento, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
74. See Radson & Waratuke, supra note 7, at 813–16.
75. Sacramento, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
76. Id. at 491.
77. Id. at 484.
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78

objective.”
The California Legislature’s purpose statement prologue to its
open meeting law stated, in part: “[t]he people of this State do not
yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The
people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants
the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is
79
not good for them to know.” Thus, the statute set forth a clear
definition of representation to guide California courts in
determining when to allow exceptions to the rule of open
government.
The Sacramento court used this definition as the rationale for
its decision, at one point writing that “[t]here is rarely any purpose
to a nonpublic pre-meeting conference except to conduct some
part of the decisional process behind closed doors. Only by
embracing the collective inquiry and discussion stages, as well as
the ultimate step of official action, can an open meeting regulation
80
frustrate these evasive devices.”
In this instance, the court
expressed a view that the “public interest” value justifying open
government was consonant with the stated rationale behind the
open meeting law: personal sovereignty includes the right to
observe the decisional process of one’s representative.
The court next defined what it viewed as the “public interest”
value underlying the government attorney-client privilege:
The privilege against disclosure is essentially a means for
achieving a policy objective of the law. The objective is to
enhance the value which society places upon legal
representation by assuring the client full disclosure to the
attorney unfettered by fear that others will be informed
. . . . If client and counsel must confer in public view and
81
hearing, both privilege and policy are stripped of value.
The Sacramento court was thus set to pit one “public interest”
against another, in an attempt to synthesize the true public interest.
At this point in its decision, the court began to wrestle with
synthesis. First, it stated, “[g]overnment should have no advantage
in legal strife; neither should it be a second-class citizen. . . . ‘There
is a public entitlement to the effective aid of legal counsel in civil
litigation. Effective aid is impossible if opportunity for confidential
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 485.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950 (West 1997) (effective 1953).
Sacramento, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
Id. at 489.
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82

legal advice is banned.’” Here, the court appeared to favor the
public interest in confidentiality. But the pendulum swung back
quickly:
As ex-lawyers, judges have been exposed to conditioning
experiences which might induce inflation of the
privilege’s value. Actually it poses competing values.
Professor Wigmore has observed that its benefits are
indirect and speculative; that, as a testimonial privilege, it
is worth preserving but is nevertheless an obstacle to the
83
investigation of the truth.
In this passage, the court clearly expressed its anxiety at defining
the public interest, worrying over “conditioning experiences” which
might bias its conception of the broader public good. The court
continued to hedge, “[i]n counterthrust to the values expressed in
the ‘right to know’ slogan, [the privilege] permits an undeniable
quantum of secrecy and, in overreaching hands, a potential tool of
84
evasion.”
This comment appeared to zero out the scales by
introducing a new undefined term—“overreaching hands”—that
supplanted the “public interest.”
The court then returned to the refuge of legislative intent:
“[i]mplicit in [the privilege’s] abrogation by implication is the
assumption that the California Legislature indulged in a knowing
choice between these two competing interests; that it adopted the
Brown Act with unmistakable intent to abolish the values inherent
85
in the lawyer-client privilege of local boards of government.”
Finally, the court abandoned its early attempts to determine
the “public interest” and found that the open meeting law can
operate concurrently with the government privilege, as long as the
86
privilege is not “overblown beyond its true dimensions.”
The court concluded by returning to the point from which it
started, stating: “[n]either the attorney’s presence nor the
happenstance of some kind of lawsuit may serve as the pretext for
secret consultations whose revelation will not injure the public
87
interest.” As to what constitutes the public interest, or who is to
82. Id. at 490 (quoting Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County
Bd. of Supervisors, 62 Cal. Rptr. 819, 821 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)).
83. Id. at 491 (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 2291, at 554 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 492.
87. Id.
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define that interest, the court was mute.
The California Legislature later superseded Sacramento,
enacting statutes which set forth specific exceptions to the open
meeting law, including one permitting closed meetings in the event
88
of pending litigation.
III. THE MINNESOTA OPEN MEETING LAW
Minnesota is one of the many jurisdictions that adopted the
89
balancing test approach advanced by the Sacramento court. The
Minnesota Legislature enacted the state’s original open meeting
90
law in 1957. In its first incarnation, Minnesota’s open meeting law
did not contain a statement of purpose or a notice provision, did
not define the term “meeting” as used in the statutory text, and did
not contain a specific exception for meetings which involved
91
privileged communications.
These gaps have been filled over
time by decisions from Minnesota courts and by further
92
legislation.
The Minnesota Supreme Court first addressed the conflict
between government attorney-client privilege and the open
93
meeting law in Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School Dist. No. 709.
Channel 10 involved an action brought by a television station
contesting school-board bylaw exceptions to the open meeting law.
88. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11126(e) (West 2006); see also Roberts v. City of
Palmdale, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 501, 505 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (noting the legislative
history to date of California Code provisions allowing exceptions to the open
meeting law in the case of pending litigation).
89. See Minnesota Open Meeting Law, supra note 19, at 405–06; see also PETER N.
THOMPSON, MINN. PRAC. Evidence § 501.04, at 246. (3d ed. 2001).
90. Minnesota Open Meeting Law, supra note 19, at 381. See Act of Apr. 27, 1957,
ch. 773, 1957 Minn. Laws 1043 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 13D.01
(2004)).
91. MINN. STAT. § 471.705 (1957), amended by MINN. STAT. § 13D.01 (2004).
See Minnesota Open Meeting Law, supra note 19, at 384–405.
92. See, e.g., Star Tribune Co. v. Univ. of Minn. Bd. of Regents, 683 N.W.2d
274 (Minn. 2004) (construing the law in favor of public access and applying the
law to the proceedings of the state university system); Berglund v. City of
Maplewood, 173 F. Supp. 2d 935 (D. Minn. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Zick v. City of
Maplewood, 50 Fed. Appx. 805 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 965 (2003)
(establishing that a banquet honoring city council members did not qualify as a
meeting under the open meeting law); Channel 10, Inc. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
709, 298 Minn. 306, 215 N.W.2d 814 (Minn. 1974) (declining to recognize a
number of exceptions to the open meeting statute); see also Marshall H. Tanick,
Clouds Descend on the Minnesota Sunshine Laws, 58 HENNEPIN LAW., July–Aug. 1989,
at 9.
93. Channel 10, 298 Minn. at 306, 215 N.W.2d at 814.
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One of the bylaw exceptions permitted closed meetings where the
board needed to discuss pending litigation. The trial court ruled
94
this exception was in the public interest. At the time Channel 10
was decided, no statutory attorney-client privilege exception
specific to the open meeting law existed.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court took the trial court
to task for its reliance on the “public interest,” writing:
[T]he trial court should not have used the public interest
as a factor in determining which acts should be enjoined
since that determination should be a policy decision for
the legislature. The wisdom of the open meeting law may
be debated in the public arena but our role is to enforce
the statute according to its terms. If it doesn’t work in the
public interest, the legislature is the branch of
95
government that should change it.
Despite this chastisement, the Channel 10 court found itself in the
same quandary as the Sacramento court: unable to reach a decision
without reference to the public interest, but with no guide to
determine just what that interest was and a vague unease about the
task in general.
The court initially noted that the government attorney’s
96
ultimate client was not the school board but the public at large.
The court then speculated, “[w]here tort claims against the school
district are being discussed by and between the school board and
its attorney, disclosure might not be in the best interests of the
97
public nor in the best interests of the administration of justice.”
The court quoted from the Sacramento decision, and also
mentioned an Arkansas case that barred the privilege exception
98
outright. At that point, the court appeared no closer to a decision
99
than when it started. The court ultimately concluded, given the

94. Id. at 308, 215 N.W.2d at 822. The trial court wrote, “Inasmuch as the
Board . . . are adversaries to other interests in some of their considerations, it must
be obvious that the Board should have the advantage afforded their adversaries in
the matter of confidential discussion with their attorneys over litigation . . . .” Id.
at 317, 215 N.W.2d at 823.
95. Id. at 317, 215 N.W.2d at 823.
96. Id. at 322, 215 N.W.2d at 826.
97. Id., 215 N.W.2d at 826.
98. Id. at 323, 215 N.W.2d at 826. The court quotes from a passage in
Sacramento in which the court tries to define the public interest in confidentiality
and the public interest in open government. See Sacramento Newspaper Guild v.
Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
99. Channel 10, 298 Minn. at 323, 215 N.W.2d at 826.
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100

novelty of the issue, that it should employ restraint. It suggested
courts use a case-by-case balancing test to determine when the
101
privilege exception is appropriate.
This suggestion was the seed
102
from which the Prior Lake decision ultimately emerged. It further
determined that in the case at bar, the pending litigation exception
103
was too broad. The decision about what would be an appropriate
closing could only be made if available facts showed which choice
104
would most benefit the public interest.
The supreme court first applied the Channel 10 balancing test
in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Housing & Redevelopment
105
Authority (HRA).
Unlike Channel 10, HRA generated sufficient
106
facts to actually apply the test.
HRA involved a meeting that was
closed to discuss pending litigation against the Housing and
107
Redevelopment Authority that environmental activists had filed.
The HRA court relied extensively on the Sacramento decision in
108
formulating its solution.
The court acknowledged that its task
109
required “a delicate balancing of public interests.” It did not shy
away from this task—querying, for instance, whether closed
meetings would truly benefit the “public.” But the court never
explicitly set forth what it felt was the particular “public interest” in
this case. It relied instead on boilerplate language invoking the
110
principles of “democracy” and the “adversary system.”
The HRA court ultimately held that the “active and
immediate” nature of the pending litigation justified application of
111
the privilege.
At the time, the action was pending in federal
district court; the closed meeting was necessary to prevent unfair
strategic advantage to the private parties involved in the
100. Id., 215 N.W.2d at 826.
101. Id., 215 N.W.2d at 826.
102. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. (HRA), 310
Minn. 313, 321–23, 251 N.W.2d 620, 624–25 (Minn. 1976). The Prior Lake decision
ultimately incorporated this principle from HRA. Prior Lake, 642 N.W.2d at 738.
103. Channel 10, 298 Minn. at 323, 215 N.W.2d at 826.
104. Id., 215 N.W.2d at 826.
105. HRA, 310 Minn. at 313, 251 N.W.2d at 620; Channel 10, 298 Minn. at 306,
215 N.W.2d at 814.
106. HRA, 310 Minn. at 313, 251 N.W.2d at 620; Channel 10 298 Minn. at 306,
215 N.W.2d at 814.
107. See HRA, 310 Minn. at 314, 251 N.W.2d at 621.
108. Id. at 320–21, 251 N.W.2d at 624; see also Note, Open Meeting Law and the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 250, 255 (1978).
109. HRA, 310 Minn. at 323, 251 N.W.2d at 625.
110. Id. at 323, 251 N.W.2d at 625.
111. Id. at 324, 251 N.W.2d at 626.
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112

litigation.
But by allowing closed meetings convened to discuss
settlement possibilities, the court implied that economic interests
can trump “democratic” interests when the threat against those
economic interests is sufficiently clear. This unstated but apparent
preference is revealing.
It suggests that the court believes
preservation of economic rights to be the primary goal of our
political system, without saying so outright.
But the court hedged against wide application of the privilege.
It wrote that the privilege exception should be “invoked cautiously
and seldom in situations other than in relation to threatened or
113
pending litigation.”
This approach muddied the waters by not
114
defining “threatened or pending litigation” and led to conflicting
decisions which Prior Lake ultimately resolved.
Two major Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions followed
115
from HRA. The first was Northwest Publications, Inc. v. St. Paul. In
Northwest Publications, the court applied the balancing test used in
116
HRA. The case involved a petition for writ of mandamus to open
117
a city council meeting previously scheduled to be closed.
The
meeting was to be closed so the council could discuss with its
lawyers the legal ramifications of a proposed nude-dancing
118
ordinance.
The court concluded that legal advice as to the
possibility of litigation over a proposed ordinance did not justify
119
The court
application of the attorney-client privilege exception.
wrote:
112. Id. at 323, 251 N.W.2d at 625.
113. Id. at 324, 251 N.W.2d at 626. Strangely enough, in its dicta, the HRA
court also made passing reference to the generally rejected First Amendment
grounds for the right to open government. Later decisions by Minnesota courts
did not adopt this policy basis for the open meeting law. See Tanick, supra note 92,
at 23.
114. Compare James S. Holmes & David C. Graven, 33 BENCH AND BAR MINN.,
Feb. 1977, at 25–38 (the authors engage in a written colloquy with lawyers from
HRA in an attempt to sort out the implications for practitioners), with CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 11126(e) (West 2005) (this section of California’s open meeting law sets
forth in clear detail what constitutes pending litigation for the purpose of applying
the attorney-client privilege exception to the law).
115. Northwest Publ’ns, Inc. v. St. Paul, 435 N.W.2d 64 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
116. Northwest Publ’ns, Inc., 435 N.W.2d at 64; HRA, 310 Minn. at 323, 251
N.W.2d at 625.
117. Northwest Publ’ns, Inc., 435 N.W.2d at 65.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 67. In distinguishing from the HRA decision, the Northwest
Publications court noted that in HRA the litigation had been commenced, where in
the present case it was merely a possibility (albeit a likely possibility given the
hostile stance taken by stakeholders in the decision). Id.
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It is not clear that closure of public meetings reduces the
risk of future litigation . . . . In some situations, the only
feasible way to avoid litigation may be to abandon
enactment of controversial proposals.
The decision
whether to adopt or abandon a proposal, however, is just
120
the sort of decision which should be made openly.
Once again, without stating it outright, the court seemed to weigh
not just the public interest in general, but the public economic
interest. Thus, the Northwest Publications court seems to suggest that
where the threat to the economic interest is unclear, or the best
manner in which to protect the economic interest is too difficult to
divine, courts should defer to the presumption of openness present
in the open meeting law.
In 1990, on the heels of the Northwest Publications decision, the
Minnesota Legislature amended the open meeting law to include
121
The amended statute
an attorney-client privilege exception.
provided minimal guidance to the courts. The new exception read,
“meetings may be closed if the closure is expressly . . . permitted by
122
the attorney-client privilege.”
123
Star Tribune v. Board of Education, Special School was the first
case to apply this new statutory privilege exception. The Star
Tribune court interpreted the exception as consistent with the
124
contours of the privilege as developed in HRA.
But the court
held, seemingly contra Northwest Publications, that the privilege
exception operated when a public agency needed legal advice
regarding “specific acts and their legal consequences,” even if
125
litigation had not been explicitly threatened.
In doing so, it
seemed to reach a different conclusion about what clarity of
economic threat justified closed meetings.
Star Tribune involved a mandamus petition filed in the wake of
126
a closed school board meeting. The board closed the meeting to
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. MINN. STAT. § 471.05, subdiv. 1(d)(e) (1998) (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 13D.01 (2004)). In 2000, the Minnesota Legislature renumbered chapter
471 as chapter 13D. MINN. STAT. § 13D.01 (2004).
123. 507 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
124. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. (HRA), 310
Minn. 313, 323, 251 N.W.2d 620, 625 (Minn. 1976); Star Tribune, 507 N.W.2d at
871.
125. Star Tribune, 507 N.W.2d at 871; Northwest Publ’ns, Inc., 435 N.W.2d at 68.
872.
126. Star Tribune, 507 N.W.2d at 870.
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discuss financial mismanagement by the district superintendent.
When the meeting reopened, the board announced its suspension
128
of the superintendent. The board then scheduled a future closed
129
meeting to discuss possible litigation against the superintendent.
The Star Tribune newspaper obtained a writ of mandamus from
the trial court that ordered the follow-up board meeting to be
130
open, unless litigation had “actually commenced.”
The board
promptly appointed an investigator to obtain information on the
superintendent’s misdeeds and make recommendations to the
131
board.
The board determined that this step “commenced”
litigation. It then held several closed meetings, which eventually
132
resulted in settlement with the superintendent.
The board also
appealed the writ of mandamus, arguing that the trial court
misinterpreted the new statutory privilege exception to the open
133
meeting law. The Star Tribune court concluded that because legal
action was “imminent or threatened,” government privilege should
134
The court wrote, “[a] meeting may be closed pursuant to
apply.
the attorney-client exception when a governing body seeks legal
advice concerning litigation strategy, but not when the discussion
focuses on the underlying merits that might give rise to future
135
litigation.”
Once again, the court had somehow calculated the
public interest but given no guidance as to how or why it reached
its decision.
So, the Star Tribune and Northwest Publications courts disagreed
on what constituted “threatened litigation” sufficient to trigger the
136
attorney-client privilege exception. More broadly, the two courts
differed on how to balance the public interest in openness against
the public interest in government privilege. Their disagreement
demonstrated the difficulty in implementing a law that calls for
judicial interpretation of the “public interest” every time the law is
enforced. Tellingly, neither Northwest Publications nor Star Tribune

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 871.
136. See Star Tribune, 507 N.W.2d at 869 and Northwest Publ’ns, Inc. v. St. Paul,
435 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
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addressed the trouble government attorneys might have using
those decisions as guides about when to close meetings.
IV. THE PRIOR LAKE DECISION
A. Facts
On February 7, 2000, the Prior Lake City Council held an
open meeting to consider a conditional use permit (CUP)
137
The council also
application filed by Ryan Contracting Co.
considered a petition for an environmental impact study that
138
sometimes accompanied CUP applications.
At the meeting, city
staff members recommended the council approve the CUP and
139
deny the petition.
The council members then heard testimony
140
When the testimony
related to the application and petition.
finished, Mayor Wes Mader introduced into the discussion a letter
that had been sent to the City by Ryan Contracting, threatening
litigation should the City deny its application or grant the petition
141
for an environmental impact study. Mayor Mader then suggested
the council retire into a closed executive session so the council
142
members could discuss the matter with their attorney.
With one
of the council members disagreeing, the rest of the council
143
adjourned into the closed meeting without him.
The Prior Lake American is a newspaper published in Prior
144
It brought a declaratory judgment action
Lake, Minnesota.

137. Prior Lake Am. v. Mader, 642 N.W.2d 729, 732 (Minn. 2002).
138. Id. The record does not reflect who petitioned for the environmental
impact study. Id. at 732 n.2.
139. Id. at 732.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 732–33. The letter expressly mentioned litigation, stating, “Ryan
Contracting may seek legal action to ensure proper handling and compliance of
this matter, as well as legal action to recover lost revenues and/or costs incurred as
a result of actions by the city of Prior Lake.” Id. at 733.
142. Id. The meeting minutes show some debate over whether or not to enter
into the closed session, with the Mayor’s argument that the “threat of litigation”
allowed closure eventually winning the day. Id.
143. Id. When the open meeting reconvened, the Mayor and another council
member made statements for the record explaining why they chose to hold the
closed session. Id. at 733–34. They apparently felt that publicly discussing the
matter with their attorney would compromise their ability to be frank and might
affect them negatively in any future litigation. Id. They eventually granted the
petition for the environmental impact study. Id. at 734.
144. Id. at 731.
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asking the court to find that the Prior Lake City Council violated
the Minnesota open meeting law when it closed its February 7,
145
2000, meeting.
The district court granted the city council’s
146
motion for summary judgment.
It held that because the council
demonstrated there was a specific threat of litigation, the attorney147
client privilege exception to the open meeting law applied.
The Prior Lake American appealed, and the Minnesota Court of
148
The court of appeals
Appeals affirmed the trial court decision.
found support in Star Tribune’s holding that the privilege could
149
operate even when litigation was imminent but not commenced.
It further noted that Northwest Publications was no longer dispositive,
since it had been decided before the statutory enactment of the
150
open meeting law’s attorney-client privilege exception. The Prior
Lake American appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
B. Reasoning
The supreme court’s Prior Lake decision can be divided into
two parts. First, the court reaffirmed the use of the HRA balancing
test to settle conflicts between attorney-client privilege and the
151
Second, it refined the category of
open meeting law.
“threatened” litigation first proposed in HRA and held this category
152
But it noted that application
subject to the HRA balancing test.
of the privilege exception in situations of “threatened litigation”
requires a more substantial showing of the need for confidentiality
153
than in situations of “pending” litigation.
The supreme court began its analysis by reiterating the policy
purposes of the open meeting law:
The Open Meeting Law serves several purposes: (1) “to
145. Id.
146. Id. at 734.
147. Id. In reaching its decision, the district court applied the HRA balancing
test and concluded that the need for confidentiality in this situation outweighed
the public’s right to access. Id.
148. Prior Lake Am. v. Mader, No. C7-00-1909, 2001 WL 379090, at *1 (Minn.
Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2001).
149. Id. at *2. The court of appeals wrote: “[i]n response to a threat from the
contractor, [the city council] needed timely legal advice on specific acts and their
consequences. That need justified the application of the exception.” Id.
150. Id.
151. Prior Lake Am. v. Mader, 642 N.W.2d 729, 736 (Minn. 2002).
152. Id. at 736, 738. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Hous. & Redev.
Auth. (HRA), 310 Minn. 313, 323, 251 N.W.2d 620, 625 (Minn. 1976).
153. Prior Lake, 642 N.W.2d at 736, 738.
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prohibit actions being taken at a secret meeting where it is
impossible for the interested public to become fully
informed concerning [public bodies’] decisions or to
detect improper influences”; (2) “to assure the public’s
right to be informed”; and (3) “to afford the public an
154
opportunity to present its views to the [public body].”
It rooted these policies in the principle that a well-informed public
155
It then located the
is the bedrock of a successful democracy.
origins of the HRA balancing test in Sacramento, quoting at length
156
from both cases.
The supreme court noted repeatedly during
this discussion that courts have traditionally shied away from an
157
“unfettered” application of the privilege exception.
Finally, the court dismissed Respondent’s argument that the
158
exception should apply whenever litigation is threatened.
In
doing so, it stated that Minnesota’s statutory privilege exception
comports with the HRA balancing test and the HRA test should be
159
used when applying the exception. The court applied a canon of
construction that invests ambiguous statutory terms with meanings
160
acquired through repeated prior judicial use. In constructing the
statute, the court did not “discern any intent” on the part of the
161
legislature to abrogate the privilege exception as defined in HRA.
The court concluded, “attorney-client privilege is . . . constrained
162
by the Open Meeting Law.”
In other words, the privilege
exception to the open meeting law should be construed more
narrowly than the general attorney-client privilege.
Proper
reduction of the privilege’s scope must be determined on a case-bycase basis, since the precise interest supporting the privilege differs
from case to case.
Once the court had established the relevance of the HRA test,

154. Id. at 735 (quoting St. Cloud Newspapers, Inc. v. Dist. 742 Cmty. Schs.,
332 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 1983)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 736.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 738.
159. Id. at 737–38.
160. “Words and phrases which have acquired an established meaning by
judicial construction are deemed to be used in the same sense in a subsequent
statute relating to the same subject matter.” Id. at 737, (quoting Minn. Wood
Specialties, Inc. v. Mattson, 274 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn.1978)).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 737–38.
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it applied that test to the circumstances of Prior Lake. In contrast
with HRA, Prior Lake involved threatened litigation related to a
164
governmental decision that had not yet been made.
The court
worried that if a public body closes its meetings when deliberating
whether or not to take some action, even if litigation is a possible
result of their decision, the closure will prevent the public from
165
providing input and exercising oversight.
Thus, the public’s
interest in open meetings when a decision is being contemplated
appears more significant than its interest in open meetings when
166
the consequences of a prior decision are being discussed.
This
conception of the public interest is consistent with that suggested
by previous Minnesota open meeting law decisions, in that it
167
appears to place a premium on the public’s economic interests.
The Prior Lake court did not claim that the privilege exception
will never operate prior to a substantive decision. But it noted that
invoking the privilege under those circumstances is “fraught with
168
peril.”
The court held that since the Prior Lake city council
invoked the privilege exception unnecessarily during its decision169
making process, the exception should not apply.
In his dissent, Justice Gilbert also applied the HRA test, but
170
arrived at a different result. He felt the policy interest of keeping
this particular meeting open did not outweigh the need for the
171
He
council to receive confidential advice from its attorney.
claimed the majority ignored the facts of the case and
surreptitiously applied a bright-line rule precluding the privilege
172
exception unless litigation has actually been commenced. Justice
Gilbert suggested that use of this bright-line rule would ultimately
163. Id. at 738.
164. Id. at 741.
165. Id. at 741–42.
166. Id. See Leslie, supra note 33, at 486–90 and text accompanying for
arguments supporting the position that pre-conduct legal advice to public officials
should not be covered by the attorney-client privilege.
167. For instance, in Channel 10, the court noted while discussing the public
interest that, “[w]here tort claims against the school district are being discussed by
and between the school board and its attorney, disclosure might not be in the best
interests of the public.” Channel 10, Inc. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 298 Minn.
306, 322, 215 N.W.2d 814, 826 (1974). One can infer here that the term “best
interests” actually refers to “economic interests.”
168. Prior Lake, 642 N.W.2d at 741.
169. Id. at 742.
170. Id. (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 743.
172. Id.
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discourage individuals from seeking government office and could
173
To support his
result in increased legal costs to the public.
position, Justice Gilbert invoked the potentially negative economic
consequences of narrowing the privilege exception. For instance,
he wrote:
When there is a real threat of litigation relating to their
decisions, [public officials] should be allowed to seek legal
counsel. This fundamental proposition is particularly
compelling when, as here, the threatened litigation
includes claims for damages against the city itself . . . .
Without legal advice, the council may fail to take proper
legal considerations into account in making its decision
and unwittingly expose its taxpayer constituents to
potentially millions of dollars of damages. . . . [I]f a
mistake is made and the city unknowingly or unwittingly
makes a legal blunder because of its inability to consult
with its attorney in private, the taxpayers are the ones who
174
really lose.
While Justice Gilbert’s application of the HRA test did not carry the
day, he did explicitly provide an economic rationale for his
175
Ironically, the extra analysis
conception of the public interest.
provided in his dissent gives practitioners more guidance than the
majority opinion; it listed specific economic factors, including the
176
threat of money damages and the potential impact on taxpayers.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PRIOR LAKE DECISION
The Minnesota Supreme Court took a positive step in Prior
Lake by constricting the attorney-client privilege exception to the
open meeting law. Both elements of its decision were crucial to
reestablishing the force of the open meeting law: the reaffirmation
of the HRA balancing test (which had been imperiled by the Star
Tribune decision), as well as the refinement of the “threatened”
177
litigation category.
Furthermore, its ruling preserved the
173. Id. at 745.
174. Id. at 743, 745.
175. Id. at 745.
176. Id. at 743–45.
177. See Moberg v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 281, 336 N.W.2d 510, 517 (Minn.
1983) (“Legislative history suggests that the Open Meeting Law was enacted to
prevent public bodies from dissolving into executive session on important but
controversial matters, and to insure that the public has an opportunity both to
detect improper influences and to present its views.”). See also Tanick, supra note
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supposition that the government attorneys’ real client is the public,
and not the officials who represent the public—a supposition
178
necessary to ensure honest and efficient government.
Unfortunately, the court did not take the final and necessary step
of stating explicitly the values it weighed in making its
determination. Its decision provides courts with a tool to use when
resolving similar conflicts. Unfortunately, it did not provide
practitioners with effective guidance in how to know when a closed
meeting is acceptable.
The HRA balancing test is the best way to ensure efficient use
179
of the privilege exception. It encourages government agencies to
weigh the need for absolute confidentiality against the public’s
interest in open deliberations before closing a meeting. Since
officials know that they will not be sued under the open meeting
law if they meet publicly, it encourages them to err on the side of
180
openness.
A bright-line test allowing for invocation of privilege
whenever litigation is threatened, or even mentioned, would
inevitably result in unnecessary use of the privilege.
Furthermore, unconditional extension of the privilege to preconduct legal advice—advice given before the government takes
action that could induce litigation—would have severely
181
compromised the policy purposes of the open meeting law.

92, at 9. Writing in 1989, Mr. Tanick lamented, “The Minnesota Open Meeting
Law was once regarded as the most expansive legislation of its kind in the country
for maximizing oversight of the workings of government . . . . [But the] Sunshine
laws are no longer so luminescent.” Id. Mr. Tanick was undoubtedly cheered by
the Prior Lake ruling.
178. This is a contentious position that is hotly debated by commentators. See
Ellinwood, supra note 7, at 1315–17; Leslie, supra note 33, at 479; Salkin, supra
note 34, at 301–02; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 51, § 5475.
179. It is useful to compare the HRA test with tests from more restrictive
jurisdictions. For instance, Florida courts so narrowly construe their attorneyclient privilege exception that they acknowledge the results generate uncertainty
but refuse to alter their approach. See Radson & Waratuke, supra note 7, at 812–
13.
180. Unfortunately for advocates of open government, enforcement of open
meeting laws has proved difficult and often ineffective. The author of Minnesota
Open Meeting Law surveyed the enforcement mechanisms available in Minnesota—
injunctions, invalidation of government actions, criminal penalties and fines—and
concluded that officials’ willingness to conduct open meetings depends as much
on their perceived moral duty to the public as to the coercive power of the law.
Minnesota Open Meeting Law, supra note 19, at 419.
181. See Leslie, supra note 33, at 490–91. Professor Leslie suggests that
extension of the privilege to pre-conduct legal advice may encourage
noncompliance since it gives a client an advantage in knowing how to decrease the
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Almost any government decision can create the opportunity for
litigation. The potential for litigation is but one of the factors
182
public officials consider when making decisions.
It would be
naïve to think officials could engage in discussions about the costs
and benefits of proceeding with a decision in the face of litigation
183
without considering other policy and political factors.
If the
public is not privy to those discussions, it cannot effectively
supervise the use of its resources or assess the wisdom of its
184
representatives.
By constricting the privilege exception to its
absolute minimum scope when applied to pre-conduct legal advice,
the Prior Lake court preserved citizens’ ability to guarantee effective
government.
Unfortunately, Prior Lake fails to give legal practitioners
effective guidance. The court left a number of very important
questions unanswered. For instance: How does one determine the
public interest? What if the person making that determination is
an attorney whose usual function is to serve elected officials
specially charged with acting in the public interest? What if the
attorney’s and official’s conceptions of the public interest clash?
How is the attorney to proceed? Most importantly, how will an
attorney know when a closed meeting will survive judicial scrutiny?
Justice Gilbert’s dissent at least gives practitioners some touchstone
as to how the court goes about calculating the public interest.
Government lawyers, government clients, and the public at large
odds of detection of misconduct and minimize the potential sanctions that might
result. Id. (citing Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
29–30 (1998)).
182. In its amicus brief, the League of American Cities makes the standard
argument that if a government attorney is forced to discuss the strengths and
weaknesses of a public agency’s legal position, the government will be
disadvantaged in future litigation. Brief for League of Minnesota Cities as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at *13, Prior Lake Am. v. Mader, 642 N.W.2d 729
(Minn. 2002) (No. C7-00-1909), 2001 WL 34677566. But it is unlikely, given the
liberal discovery rules available, that much of what could be communicated in an
abstract discussion of potential liability would be protected or would benefit the
government if kept secret.
183. In Prior Lake, the supreme court noted that the record did not reflect the
content of the city council’s closed Feb. 7, 2000, meeting, but it seemed dubious
that what occurred behind closed doors contributed in any way to “litigation
strategy” or was limited to strictly legal advice. See Prior Lake Am. v. Mader, 642
N.W.2d 729, 740 (Minn. 2002).
184. “When the public is only allowed to witness the final outcome of
deliberations, the public is denied access to governmental decision-making
because the reasoning behind the final outcome is not disclosed.” Pupillo, supra
note 14, at 1179.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss2/8

28

Riach: Civil Procedure—Epilogue to a Farce: Reestablishing the Power of
8. RIACH - RC.DOC

2007]

3/7/2007 1:26:07 PM

PRIOR LAKE AMERICAN V. MADER

709

will benefit if in similar future decisions the majority specifies the
component parts of the public interests it balances.
VI. CONCLUSION
Before Prior Lake, the attorney-client privilege exception
185
Now, the
threatened to defang Minnesota’s open meeting law.
HRA balancing test is well established and courts will not likely
allow the privilege to operate during decision-making except in
extreme situations. Two open meeting law cases decided since
Prior Lake confirm that Prior Lake protected the public interest
without compromising the government’s ability to address
186
prospective litigation. One case aggressively promoted the public
187
the other case protected a city
interest in open meetings;
188
council’s ability to use the privilege exception when appropriate.
Together, they show that the Prior Lake test is an effective tool
Minnesota courts can use to decide when the privilege exception
should operate. The fact that two similar cases arose right on the
heels of Prior Lake also shows, however, that Prior Lake failed to set
forth guidelines specific enough that practitioners can rely on
them to stay out of court.

185. See Prior Lake, 642 N.W.2d at 742.
186. Free Press v. County of Blue Earth, 677 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. Ct. App.
2004) (reiterating the narrow application of the attorney-client privilege exception
to the open meeting law and requiring a municipality to state specific grounds for
using the privilege to close a meeting); Brainerd Daily Dispatch v. Dehen, 693
N.W.2d 435 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (using the Prior Lake balancing test, the court
held the attorney-client privilege exception operated where city council denied
parade permit and applying organization threatened litigation and took several
affirmative steps toward filing suit).
187. See Free Press, 677 N.W.2d at 477. The court wrote, “Narrow construction
of exceptions to the open meeting law advances the legislative purpose to support
broad public access to the decisions of public bodies.” Id.
188. See Brainerd Daily Dispatch, 693 N.W.2d at 443.
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